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TALKING POINTS: TEXAS AND AFRICA 
**Despite its much touted prosperity in the oil boom of the '70s, 
falling oil prices have today engulfed Texas in a severe economic 
crisis: 1987 unemployment reached 635,000, and one out of five 
Texans lived on below-poverty-line incomes <pp. 16-20; see 
also specific cities, pp. 20ff>. 
**The oil "majors" -- the transnational oil companies that, along 
with associated banks, have extracted so much oil and profits 
from Texas and independent African countries -- reinvested little 
in those areas to develop a balanced integrated economy and 
provide jobs and rising incomes; but they have collaborated with 
the apartheid regime to inves t in refineries in South Africa, 
violating UN and OPEC sanctions to import and refine crude oil 
for the South African military industrial complex which 
perpetuates minority rule and dominates and destabilizes the 
southern African region <for history, see pp. 3-5; for South 
Africa links, see pp. 9-10; for oil companies in the southwest 
region, see Notes on Issues •.•• attached.) 
**Texas· strategy of attracting high tech industries, linked to 
military production, aggravated Texas· lop-sided development 
geared to oil extraction. Located in urban centers, high tech 
i ndustries pay a third of their employees top wages, but the two 
thirds who actually manufacture their products receive a bare 
minimum -- and companies like IBM contract those jobs out 
wherever wages are lowest, across the border in maquiladora 
plants or even f urther away in places like South Africa. <pp 6-7, 
10-12; and, re specific cities, p. 20ff; for general 
characteristics of military and high tech, see Notes on 
Issues .•.. attached.> 
**A few mil itary contractors, like General Dynamics, reap high 
profits, but their dependence on high tech means they employ 
relatively few workers, with an uncertain future geared to 
maintenance of a war -scare society. Military research dominates 
Uni versity activities, accentuating increased high tech which 
reduces employment, instead of focusing on new programs designed 
to provide jobs and rising incomes for the people of Texas <pp. 
15-16>. 
**Texas· 46 military bases provide low-paid service jobs in 
surrounding communities, but they hardly cover hidden costs, 
including tax losses on the 589,000 acres they cover, tax costs 
for roads, schools, etc., for servicemen's families, and 
pollution of nearby land and water resources<pp. 15>. 
**Rising US expenditures on the military have cost Texas citizens 
in terms of rising debt, falling real living standards, and 
near-destruction of the social welfare safety- net built over the 
- :L -· 
years since the Great Depression of the 1930s. At the same time. 
the militarist ideology has aggravated racism and anti-unionism. · 
<pp. 17·-- 18>. 
**Redirection of the billions of dollars spent on the military 
could provide far more jobs and better incomes for Texans~ and 
liberation and development in Africa could lay the basis ~or 
mutually beneficial trade that would raise the living standards 
of peoples on both sides of the Atlantic <pp. 18-20>. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------
MILITARIZATION IN AFRICA AND THE US SOUTHWEST 
INTRODUCTION: 
The growing US militarization of Africa 
affects the economic situation confronting the 
populations of the southwest United States in two 
respects: First, given the technological revolution 
that has shrunken the world's parameters, US military 
support for conservative governments seeks to open up 
the rich mineral and agricultural resources and vast 
low paid labor reserves of the African continent 
(three times the size of the United States with a 
population of over 500 illion) to US transnationals, 
putting the wages and working conditions of the US 
Southwest in competition with those of the oppressed 
workers of places like apartheid South Africa; and, 
second, the increased militarization of the US itself, 
including the Southwest? while enriching a few very 
large transnational corporations and counties, imposes 
both direct and hidden costs that undermine the living 
standards of the majority of people of the region. 
I. BACKGROUND: To understand the consequences of US 
militarization in Africa in the U.S. southwest, it helps, first, 
to outline the historical circumstances that shaped the current 
dichotomous development of resources in Texas: 
A. Texas emerged relatively recently as the Southwest' s regional 
subcr-:?nter·: 
1. The Spanish colonial government operating from its 
headquarters located in Mexico, largely neglected Texas with its 
then-low population density and apparently limited resources. 
2. In the 19th Century, ·Anglos· from the US South, 
obtained permission to settle, laying the foundation first for 
' independence' from Mexico (which itself had just won indpendence 
from Spain>, and then US stateship. 
··-· 2 
3. Many of the US southerners who settled in Texas 
brouqht slaves and the racist attitudes that led the new state to 
join the Confederates in the Civil War and, i n stitut i onalized, 
persisted into the 20th Century as the Texas political economy 
became more closely knit into that of the United States: 
a. In lt36().1 in D,·::tlla~:::.~ i:.<. ~";E":.·l+""· ~;~::<I. (,;)CtE·d "Comm:i.t'i:.:P(·;.) o+ 
F :i. + t y ..... t t.,Jo ' ' pub 1 :i. c: J. y 1 yn c h ("!cl t h ,, .. E?E.l ''!.; 1 E:\ V(''!S •1 ..:i ,,,.l i 1 f!:'d tJ n 
suspicion of starting +ires a s a prelude to a slave up-rising 
(Dall as Peace Times, vol 3, No. 3). 
b . The coming of the railroads, attracted by enor mous 
land grants (accompanied in Texas as elsewhere in the nation 
by widespread corruption) integrated the state into the 
national economy; 
on 1 'I 
c:. F:liant liv•?:! <:~.tock 
eventually reined in 
ranches spread across the p la i n s , 
by fences (that provided an 
important market for the midwest's steel makersl; 
sharecroppers (almost half the state's farm population by the 
turn of the 19th century> grew cotton on big plan tations i n 
the east; vast fruit fa rms, using migrant labor, often from 
Mexico (among US states, Texas became the third largest 
employer of migran t labor) spread up through the Rio Grand e 
4. Di scovery of oil at the turn o+ the century coincided with 
the development of industry, particularly, the automobile, 
in a few decades t r ansforming Texas into the nation's l eading 
oil producing state, and simultaneously agg rava ting the dualistic 
development of the state's economy: 
a. From the outset, oil drilling and production was 
capital-intensive, employing relatively few workers, but 
requiring increasing capital expenditures: 
~ - Legislation introduced by Governor Hogg protected the 
posit ion of a few lucky 'independents' who became 
extremely wealthy 
a) These used their wealth and influence to play 
an increasingly dominant role in Texas and, eventually, 
US national politics; 
b) From the outset, the oil men explicitly 
excluded blacks and, with a few minor exceptions, other 
non-Angles. The relationship to South Africa in 
popular ideology appeared explicitly: 
"td. thouqh s;;E'\l£·?1''' c:d hunc:iJ~f:?d Chi nc~sE~ 1 :i. vee! in BE·'aumDnt 
<the home of thc first 1901 gusher, 'Spindletop,' -AS > 
operating laundries and restaurants, and there were 
Italian immigrant farmers in the area~ the milkinq of 
Big Hill was dominated by white, native-born Americ~ns. 
The black man, while he was therc~ was at the bottom. 
For a time blacks dug earthcn tanks in which tD store 
011 and livcd in a section called South Africa . They 
did their work , ... and bothered no one. But some of 
the whites, emphasizing their intent with gun shots, 
drove the black men from the field. Producing black 
(:jCJJ.cl Wi::-..~;:. cif·2(·o~fl'lE'd V-.!hit.f.:" me=.•n··~;; t•\JOI'·k. 11 L,J.Pir'E?':;J.py ,! {~ ~:\ i:'\.~;)2\ o-f 
Wealth -The Rise of the Texas Oilmen <New YDrk: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1978>J 
b. Though initially the 'independents' reaped enormous 
sums, few had enough funds to finance development of the oil 
refining and marketing business and eventually most brought 
in outside capital from the big Eastern banks and f i nancial 
:i. n ~::, t :i. t:. u t:. i on ~::; 
i . Some of these, like First National City Bank (later 
to grow into Citicorp, the world's largest bank) and 
Chase Manhattan Bank, had grown through their links 
with the Rockefeller-Standard Oil nexus; 
11. Others, like Morgan, got their start with profits 
generated by the Civil War and the subsequent railroad 
and industrial boom); 
111. By the mid-20th Century, outside capital and the 
11 o i 1 m,:-.. j DJ' .. ~:; ' 1 t h c:\ t. Cl~\1n E'!!d the , ... f?f i n f.:? I'" i E'<::; c\il d n '"\ t. :i. on<":\ 1 
market networks, cont~Dlled an estimated 90 percent of 
Texas oil business; nevertheless, the conflict between 
the 'independent' well-owners and the 'majo~s · 
continued to influence the shape o+ state and national 
oil regulatDry legislation. 
(.. r:l+ t t2t'" ~~01'"1 d ~'JaJ'" I I ~ thE? c: omp (;?t i t j_ VI!:? us C) :i. 1 b u s_;:i. n I;? ~"'-~'"· 
milked the nat ion's ~ese~ves with little regard for future 
n t::::'E:.'d ~3 ~ 
i. This provided cheap fuel, stimulating the 
growth Df the automobile industry that came to dominate 
US industry, undermi ning public t~ansport and forcing 
US citizens, especially in rural areas no matter how 
pDor, to buy cars simply to go to work. 
·-·· ... q. ·--
1 1 • T'h 0:~ 11 mE•. j or·<::. 11 ·f Clun c:! n (o·?\1',1 c h .;::ap E~r- sou. I~ c e~o'· cf o :i. 1 
abroad -- after World War II discovering Africa's vast 
resources; and, in the 1970s with OPEC's successful 
efforts to raise oil prices, reaped billions in profit. 
5. The oil boom and oil's domination over Texas politics 
fostered neglect of much of the rest of the state, cont r ibuting 
to a per vasive dualism that today characterizes the 
economy: [The source of the data provided below, unless 
otherwise cited, is the U.S. Department of Commerce, State and 
Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1986; more detailed may be obtained 
for each county in Texas in the City and County Data Book, 
available in your public library.] 
a. The state's productive structure, centered around oil, 
has grown into a lop-sided dependence on non-productive 
activities which require state and regional prosperity to 
persist, while the productive sectors have been declining: 
i. In 1984 1 the highly cap i tal-intensive oil business 
employed 269,000 workers, barely 3 percent of the non-farm 
labor force. They earned a high average annual pay, 
ii. Agriculture permanently employs about 250,000 people, 
less than 3 percent of the non-farm labor force: 
a) As throughout the nation, the national farm 
crisis, caused by rising farming costs and low prices, 
has squeezed out family farms in Texas. Cotton 
cultivation, depressed from the competition of 
synthetics and overseas cultivation of cotton in areas 
like Africa where labor is far cheaper, became 
mechanized, pushing former sharecroppers into ~ne 
c1~1es; large fruit plantations along the Rio Grande 
employ migratory labor; livestock ranching, 
i ncreasingly characterized by corporate farms, employs 
relatively few workers. 
b) 300,000 to 400 1 000 migrant farm workers (including 
their families), 92% Hispanic, work on Texas farms, 
earning average gross income of $3,900 -- less than 
half of them getting minimum wage; most families lack 
hot water and toilets, with average infant mortality 
125% of national average; thei r work is rated second 
most dangerous in US (Data supplied by Kate Ferguson, 
Dept of Agriculture, op. cit.) 
c) Today, of a tota l population of over 16 
million, a little more than 3 million -- roughly one 
in five people -- live in the rural areas, the home of 
..... ~i 
111. Manufacturing employs somewhat over a million workers 
(two thirds in production)~ about 17 percent of the labor 
force (abo v e the national average of 12%, but well below, 
l'·?i.J '! 1\!c:w· i.:l"l E>::\t'"Dl :i.na? :2'!~~.' Olr' f3outh c.::\r·ol 'i nd 'I ~::;:~ . \ 'I ~·J hi:-?l"' f:.~ i OV..J 
wages had attracted more labor i n tensive industr i es). 
a) Texas manufacturing centers around hi tech 
electrical machinery and equipment and the aerospace 
industry largely concentrated in urban centers. In 
~~~~~t~~g=~o::r~h:e~:~!~~~r :~~~;g:v:~~g~~~e~~l ,584 ' 
thousand dollar s above those of the Carolinas; but two 
thirds of high tech industry worker s do unskilled, low 
pa1d jobs which can easily be contracted out by firms 
li ke IBM to employers with plants in lower paid areas 
like Mexico or further away to places like South 
Pd: j"' i. c>:'\ " ( \31.7?\0) '! E?q 'I {:q:J cU'" thE:.' i d E:\n d t h f2 u~; f:) ou t. i"l (".''<:\ ~:;; t '.1 
chapter 7 for the characteristics of high tech 
i ndLt~~:.t:J .... )/ u ) 
h) In thE~ p u~:=;t t;.,loJ'"l d I/ JE:l.l'" I I p E·')!"" :i. ucJ .1 thE' 1 1 m;;;, qui 1 ,:7tc:l O!'" a'' 
industry program , also known as the twin-plan t 
program, set up under special provisions of Mexican 
and American law, permitted duty-f ree imports of 
machinery, equipment and materials to be imported into 
Mexico for manufacturing in US plants for resale in 
the US where duty covered only the Mexican v alue 
added. Mexican wages at 45 cents per hour (after the 
peso devalued), attracted many l arge US firms to move 
unskilled produc tive jobs to Mexico. The number of 
maquiladora plants in Mexico tripled from 453 in 1975 
to over 1,300 in 1987, increasing the number of jobs 
from 67,214 to over 300 1 000. From 1980 to 84, Texas 
lost almost 6 percent of its manufacturing jobs, 
somewhat more than the national average (4.3%) a nd 
more than triple the South's average (1.8%). 
~:~to~: ~~:~r~=~ld:~0:t 1 ~~~e:0a~:~s~h~o~~~;P~~~u~:~r~nal 
average: services (+23.8%), wholesale and retail trade 
(+12.5%), and finances (+23.9%). 
a) The growth of high wage, hi-tech i ndustries in the 
cities, cross-the- bord e r trade and financing 
activities, speculative real estate a c tivities, and an 
expanding retirement community provided a seemingly 
E:!nc:l1 e!:;~;; boom .. 
b) bY 1984, these sectors employed about 3,285,000, 
over half the labor force. 
c 1 c) Instead of reinvesting to create a more 
balanced state economy, Republic Bank and, to a lesser 
extent, First City Bank Corp of Texas and Texas Bank 
had loaned Texas depositors' funds in places like South 
Africa (see below, p. 13). 
v. With the collapse of world oil prices in 1984-5, the 
oil bubble burst, many banks and real estate speculators 
went bankrupt, a number of manufacturing indust ries moved 
across the border or f urther away to lower wage areas, and 
unemployment and growing poverty spread throughout the 
state. 
a1 Several rural Texas banks went broke. The 
state's largest bank, the Republic Bank of Houston, 
faced serious financial difficulties associat ed with 
the oil-real estate slump of the 1980s, but merged with 
Interfirst Bancorp to jump from 26th to 13th largest in 
the US. 
IN 1984 TEXAS WAGES AVERAGED SLIGHTLY ABOVE THE NATION'S: 
Employment 




Retail trade ) 1,614.0 
Finance, etc. 414.9 
Services 1,257.5 
Wages (1983 annual average) 
Texas US 
$30 , 698 
$21,584 
$23,951 









Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, State and Metropolitan Area 
Data Book, 1986 
II. THE CASE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA illustrates the reasons for and 
the impact of US militarization in Africa, with its implications 
for living standards in Texas: 
A. The post World War II technological revolution 
facilitated the growth of US transnational corporate investment 
in Africa, first to gain access to rich mineral and agricultur al 
resources, us1ng the cheap labor reserves (even lower than those 
of la t in America because of the disruption caused by centuries of 
the slave trade, followed by a hundred years of outr i ght colonial 
rule); and then to build manufacturing industries! especially in 
7 
South Africa where aparth e id ensured continued low cost labor 
along with access to southern African raw material s , markets for 
manufactu r ed goods, and high rates of profit . 
CThis background is detailed in Seidman, The Roots of Crisis 
in Southern Afr i ca <Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985> and 
;~3 E' :i. cl rn,:H: , ( :lj::) i:H" t h F2 i d ,:·:H1 d -L: h \":! U. ~-J. ~3ou -!::. h E·?<:J. ~:; t. , + Dl' .. ·t. h com :l n q , t:·~::.p .. 
c~ h :::; ., ::::; ~::·t n c:l 4 ) 
1. US mi ning and financ i al interests have long invested in 
souther n African minerals, grad ually shifting t o sources there 
while reducing mining output and laying off US miners: 
Africa's leading mining finance house, the 
Group , began o perations at the outset of World 
War I with the help of Morgan financial interests; and has 
since expanded its ties in the US through a growing network of 
corporate interests, including Engelhard (which provided it 
with Dem ocratic Party links); Newmont Mining (which today owns 
Peabody, a leading US coal mining company, in partnership with 
Bechtel, which contributed Shultz and Weinburger to Reagan ' s 
C; \·~1. b i. !l E::; t: ) ; E:\ n ci {:·! rn {·?:~ i' ~ i. C:: a. n Jvl E~ -1:: -:::\ 1 [~ 1 i HI<::\>~ ( {~1!..,.1 ~~-~ >< ) ( ~:;. (~::• f"::? 1 :i. ~~:; t·. C) -f 
Anglo-American international affiliations in Innes, Anglo 
America a n d the Rise o f Modern South Africa) . 
the Anglo American Group, operating through its offshore 
Bermuda base, MINORCO, became the second largest foreign 
investor in the United States, with controlling investments in 
a wide range of activities, beginning in mines and extending 
into f i nance, includinq the leading Wall Street firm, Phibro 
Salomon, with links to the Rockefeller Citicorp. 
b. Starting a f ter the firs t World War and continu i ng 
through the aparthe i d era into the present, in collaboration 
with US and British firms, the Angl o Group developed mines 
throughout South and southern Afric a , including copper in 
Zambia, Namibia , Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zaire (where it also 
worked with Bel g ian interests); diamonds in Botswana, Namibia, 
Angola, and Tanzania; iron ore in Swaziland and, in 
cooperation with t he then-Rhodesian government, Zimbabwe; 
plat inum and gold in South Africa; and uranium in South Africa 
and Namibia (in cooperation with Rio Tinto Zinc) . Un ion 
Carbide developed chrome and ferro chrome mines in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa. As the US companies shifted to southern and 
particularly South Africa for their sources of these minerals, 
they strengthened the basis of the argument that these 
p :'-uv:i. c:iec:i 1 1 <:;;'\:.l'- ioi.-t.".eqi c:: 11 i nt.(::.:• l' .. f:~~::;t·::::. !,,;i· .. ; :i. ch L..!E:; p u l :i. C::\' rnu.s;t:. jJr .. ut: E•ct., 
i. Companies like AMAX and Newmont could close down the 
southwestern mines and import copper and other strategic 
minerals, including lead, platinum and vanadium (see 
Appendix I in Roots of Crisis) from their southern African 
mines where they paid work~rs a fraction of what they paid 
C:.:Z 
l, , •• t 
unionized US mine workers. 
ii. I n the late 1970s and '80s, world copper prices 
plummeted. The indepen dent African copper producers 
Zambia, Zaire and Zimbabwe -- having adopted western advice 
to expand copper instead of redirecting their copper 
profits to mor e balanced integrated economic development, 
experienced growing foreign debts. The IMF imposed 
conditions forc ing them to devalue their currencies, 
further lowering their workers ' real wages to cut their 
copper prices, i n a desparate effort to expand their copper 
::;: . .3. l E:: !:.=~ " 
a. As African states won political independ enc e and improved 
communications and shipping facilities reduced the costs of 
long-distanc e production in the post World War II era, US oil 
11 rn.·:,\ j Ui'" ~: ::. 11 E·!>~ p ·'.'in d F'c:l t h.:-:.? :i. 1·-· r0:·: p 1 01~ at. :i. cJn i:':\n c:l F:>: p 1 C• :i. t:. i:':l. t . :i. c::.n of 
African crude oil in Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, and Angola, 
shipping it to their r efineri es a t home or elsewhere for sale 
throughout the world's mar kets. 
:i.. Ir .. , j.t:ially.1 
(~i + 1 .... :i. c: E1. n ·:::~ t. <-::~ t to:::~ !::; ·· 
the US oi l companies shipped away the 
low cost crude, paying little in taxes, 
remitting most ot their profits without regard for national 
cJ E~Vi·?:' 1 C.ip mt:!J"l t .. With the advent of OPEC, the participating 
Af rican states fo r ced up world oil prices and captured a 
larger share of t he resulting investable surpluses, but, 
through t hei r control of the major refineries and marketing 
net works~ the companies reaped even higher profits 
attaining the status of the world's largest companies with 
i l"'l C:: CJ!1,E:.i ~::; £·2>~ C:: C·:·:· f~d i n (;,i t: h t-~\ t C)-f ~;F::~ \/f=~~~·· i:3.1 i n d (.;;; p F2n ci f':?n t (~·I-f 1···· i C:: E:t. n 
C: C) U. n t !''· i F:! ~:~ . .. 
ii. Some African countries sought to reinvest their oil 
profits in the i r national development, achieving some 
success in restructuring their economies to meet their 
p F:~ C:i p 1 E' ::::. n f:? (·?.·~ d -~: } II 
J J :: ... The non-oil producing countries~ their modern 
export-orient e debckaves dependent on oil for fuel and 
lubrication, hac:l to spend up to a third of their export 
earnings to buy oil 1 regardless of the price-- a 
significant factor in their mounting external d ebt. 
iv. In southern Africa, Angola, upon attain liberation 
from the Portuguese in 1976, negotiated an agreement with 
Gu.l ·l: U :i. 1 ( n Ohl C::h ev l'" on ) t n ;:~c qu :tl'" t,,., ~sh o:\1'" E"c:::. :in bu 1 f ' ~.::. (ll"i q D 1 ,;,;. n 
aff iliate, and half the profits. In return for its shares, 
Gulf would train local people, prov i de the necessa r y 
technology~ and refine and sell the oil through i ts 
international marketing network. 
a) Through Gulf, the US remained Angola's leading 
t.r- <::td :i. n q p a!"' t n el~ n 
b ) A member of the nine-state association of 
independent southern African countries (the Southern 
African Developmen t Coordination Conference, SADCC> 
<- •-, .::\ 1- <:: n · 1 ;-, !·-. +· +· ·-l i ... n ··- ·~ , .. , I'" .. , <· e ·i· i"l .. , ·i- <- .. , .; , .. , -i , .. · - J · .. --~ ·1- .. ... ·1 
'-!•\- \ .. --~·---···"::!' ''- · ... t .. --L.I!-.} \'.:",. C:\L- ..... C.:\_t.,\!:!.1. t L.,r:::\/8 .t)pfnl-:.:•fl ~ .. c:\fi(. 
reduce dependence on South Africa, Angola agreed, once 
it established its own refinery capacity and developed 
the essential infrastructure, to provide lower-cost oi l 
products to its fellow SADCC members 
b. Th e 'majors' made their biggest oil refinery investments 
on the e ntire African continent, not in the i ndependen t 
states, but in South Africa. There they made a key 
contribution to building up the r a cist minority's 
mil itary-industrial capacity to o p press the African ma jorit y 
at h ome and destabilize the entire southern African reqion. 
:i . Ir·oni. c,''l. lly.; Sou.t.h Plfr···:i. c::a h<::\<:5 no 
own; b ut it depends on the oil majors 
oil deposits of its 
-- Caltex (Stan d ard 
Oil of California and Texaco) 1 Mobil, and Shell-BP --to bring 
in oi l for their refineries . This they did~ under a heavy 
curtain of government secrecy, despite the OPEC and UN 
attempts to impose an effective boycott. (Mobil ea r l i er 
helped to evade the UN boycott against the then-Rhodesian 
government which had unilaterally declared in depen den ce (UDJ) 
to prevent establishment of major ity rule i n what, aT~er 1 5 
years of guer i l l a war, became Zimbabwe.) 
ii. Shell-BP collaborated with the South African 
government-owned Sentrachem to bui ld a petrochemicals 
industry, essential for inputs to industry and its 
growing military buildup. 
iii. The US enqineerinq firm, Fluor, constructed a gian t 
oil-from- coal facility for th e minority govern men t ' s 
SABOL, designed to reduce i ts dependence on imported oil 
(it s capacity remains secret, but estima tes range from 
10% to 30% of South Africa's oil needs. 
CFor det ai ls re Fluor and Shell-BP's anti-u nion 
activities in South Africa and the US Sout heast, see 
Apartheid and the US Sout heast, Ch. 6) 
3. Manuf a cturing: 
a. All the independ ent Afr ican states sought to attract 
i n vestment in industries t o increase productive employment 
opportunities and raise living standards; but three fou rth s 
of all U.S. manufacturing investment on the ent i re continent 
went into the military-industrial manufacturing business of 
aparthei d South Africa. Essentially, US firms began to 
extend the maquiladora concept to South Africa where, until 
t he 1980s, the r egime pursued policies that ensured them 
rates of profit averaging 25 percent . 
b. As anti-apartheid divestment pressures mounted, leading 
to the Congressional passage of US sanctions (over Reagan's 
veto) US firms sold their South African plants and other assets, 
cont.r-i:lcti ng t•'-J:i. t.h 1 cc:-::•.11 y ·····l:i<:tS('E!d + i l~rns (t .. Jh :i. c::h thf:!Y ''c.;c;l d ' ' t.o thr:.' 
local managers or to the Anglo American Group) to sell them 
the machinery, equipment and materials, if necessary helping 
to finance it. They sought thus to continue to take 
,;t c:l\f"i:".nt,:\CJ£·2 Of:: 
(For details re firms and their role in southern Africa, 
see Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 4) 
i. Cheap labor disciplined under apartheid conditions 
for labor intensive manufacturing processes l ike those of 
auto firms like GM, Ford and Chrysler <the latter two 
sold out to the Anglo American Group>; or textiles <In 
the 1980s, for example, Sears Roebuck could buy t ex tiles 
from Taiwanese firms hiring workers i n the bantustans for 
$7 a week, compared eg to North Carolina workers -- the 
lowest paid in the US -- who received $7 an hour; while 
North Carolina lost 43 textile jobs a day, Sears could 
~::.f:? 11 '' ·r <:3. :i. ~·Jan r:::·e.st-::-:·-···mc-i.d t:::· '' g DDd !':.; dE·s.p :i t. f? t. he? un f.=n f Dt'"· c r:::~cJ Ll:~; 
s;,::\nct::i. on~;c, .. > 
11. Access to South and southern African crude materials , 
produced by low paid labor in mines and on corporate and 
settler farms throughout the region and shipped in via 
trading netwDrk s dominated by the Anglo American Group. 
1 1 1 .. Access to markets, including: 
o+ the South African *The wealthv white 20% 
population whD could afford J Ll>~ l..ti,..~/ c!urE•.blr:) qooc:l~=.;:; 
f::' 1 f:2C: t ;·-· :i. c i::J.l ' i::\U t omot i VEo ~ 
nuclear-related tec:hnoloqies for the regime's military~ 
expandinq as it sought to perpetuate its oppressive 
rule at. home and destabilize the regiDn <sales through 
local South A+rican-Dwned firms enabled the US 
manufacturers to evade the letter of the US sanctions 
1 c-:1w > :: GE:. Y G(,::'n E) I'- ,:;,_1 1'1ct otr- s:. ~ I.'Jt:?s. t. i n q h ou. sE~ l I T~.:·r 
contributed these kinds of goods; 
..... :!. l 
*Im 1~roved i.·.·. r.•.•.•.•r.-. . l,-,.,-,r.·.·.J·.1 •. r.·. ·.• . r .. ·l·.l· .•.... •.•.•'.·.•.•.•. t.· . • .·., 1 .. ~ 1-,,--.. ·,. ,~. J.·.·. I·.··.··.·· ,. · ' 1 
. . . . ~ne m1nor 1 ~y ~o 
develop industry , mining, agriculture and the military 
t.·\.f h :i. 1 1·:·:~ ,, .. t:=• c:i Lt c:: :i. r-, q ' ' ci f:·c' p E·:· r-, c:l 1·?2 r'! c:: c::•· ' ' C:J n b 1 ,·:\ c k :L E:\ l::i u ,,.. ..... ..... E•. m i':'< . • :.i c r·· 
factor contributinq tu gruwing unemployment in Sou th 
Africa; firms like IBM , Burroughs, Ho n eywell he l ped 
make white South Africa one of the most -- if not the 
most highly computerized populations in the world . 
while black unemployment soared to an estimated 30 t~ 
40 percent of the populations as almost half the black 
population was forced to struggle for survival on the 
destitute bantustans, the least fertile, least well 
watered 13 percent of the nation's land. 
*The neighboring 
econom i es remained 
C C• U n t: !' .. :i. (·:=.• <;:;. !t.,! J·-, Ci <;::. E·' externally nriented 
imported machinery, d f::·:'p t:?n cl0:n t c;n 
equipment, and luxuries 
South Africa -- as lnng 
econ nmic 1 political and 
t.C) bu·~/ +I'" Of{) :l t. 
for the elites, now produced :i.n 
as Snuth Africa by exerting i t s 
mi litary pnwer to coerce them 
c. The Reagan administrat ion's unwillingness to enfurce 
the 1986 Conqressional sanctions fac i litated South Africa ' s 
continued purchase of advanced technologies and exports 
<through ill-cnncealed channels) of items like steel, coa l , 
uranium in European and even US markets. 
4. US banks gave leadership in financing South Africa's 
milit a ry industrial buildup: 
a. Afte r the liberation of Mozambique and Ango l a in the 
mid-1970s, and the Sowetn uprising of 1976 in South 
Africa, US transnationals invested less money directly in 
South African mines and factories; instead they relied on 
their control of technology, finance, and marketing , ~ o 
continue profiting from low cost South African labor and 
l' .. ,?<;::. c:JU.I' .. C::(::,•!::;" 
b. The largest US banks, led by Citcorp -- with its close 
links tn US oil majors mobilized US and Eur opean savings 
to lend to Snuth Africa: 
i. South Africa needed funds to finance its continued 
imports of sophisticated technnlogies, military 
equipment (in violation of the UN sanctions - signed by 
the US government), and oil; 
ii. Citicorp alone loaned almost twice as much as the 
next largest US lender. 
··-· :L :::: .... 
South Africa included RepublicBank Corp <Houston), 
$101.9 million; First city Bancorp of Texas; and Texas 
Commerce Bancshares, Inc. By 1988, although 
rn<::~.i r"rti:\i ni r19 Prrrlt:.~l'-:i. cc:\n bu.~=~~i nf::~::.~:;t-:::::; pi'"C:t\li dt·?d 2\ li!,·· c)]. F:.\ rnc:;cJE'l 11 
i n ~:)out: l"l (.) ·f ,,.. :i. c: a •.1 t h F::• F~E-'P ub 1 :i. c: Elc:\n k h ;::lei dec: 1 D.r·· ('?cl 11 un t i 1 
substantial improvements are made ... benefitt ing all 
it ~:5 p l".'Op 1 f'= I~ E'CJ c.\. I'-d 1 f'='.'S~'· Df 1'- c:<C f:!• 11 i t lrJDU 1 ci m<O:\ k E"-' n 0 n E''•J 
loans to the South African private or public: sectors or 
sell Krugerrands (It did not mention trade f i n ance -
~:; r:-? E: b (·~! J. C)l:\1) " 
c. The 1986 US Congessional sanctions (passed over 
Reagan's veto) prohibited further direc t loans to South 
Africa, but did not prohibit trade finance 
i. In 1987 , Citicorp sold its South African assets to 
the Anglo American Group, which combined them with 
Barclays Banks to set up the First National Bank of 
South Africa- with about 40% of South Africa's bank 
:1. 1 .. II c ~ ••• • 11 ,,,; including Citic:orp, continued to 
finance the sale of goods by and to South Africa, with 
little monitorinq by the Reagan administration as to 
whether these vi olated sanctions. 
i ii.Led by Citicorp, US and European bankers agreed to 
reschedule South Af rica's private foreign deb t - - about 
$14 bil l ion -- essentially rolling it over to give the 
aparth e id regime time to overcome the economic crisis 
brought about by growing pressure by the black 
population for majority rule. 
8. Increasingly backed by military intervention, the Reagan 
Administration's Constructive Engagement Policy 1n southe~n 
(.',f i, .. :i. c: <::i. E\ :i. rnE~d t. D su ~:; t: a i n t h (7:! c: on d :i t :i. on!:; i n '·"!h :i. c h Ub '1 :i. n t I'"!'.· I'- i':?~''· t ~"'· 1' 
could thus expand: 
1 .. It.: :i. n c Dl". p CJI'- ,,, t r:: .. ~:; a t. v·.Jo·····!"'·t.;·- <:3.!""l d (:;,~c:i p o 1 i c: y ~ ( ·f o1··· c:l et ,::t i 1 <:5 ., c,:;t:~<:-::· 
Seidman, Root s of Crisis in Southern Africa, especially c:hs. 
E:\nd 6 .. ) :: 
to 
r.::· 
~ . ..1 
a. l t seeks to enc:ou~age the South African ~egime 
compromise with its domestic opponents to implement 
to eliminate the most blatent. racist features while 
maintaining the profitable economic s tatus quo; 
' r· F::-f c:.w· ms ' 
b. It aims to slow down change in the neighboring count r ies 
to give the South African ~egime time to achieve this goal, 
while retaining its dominant position throughout the region .. 
2.. In implementing this policy, the Reagan administ~ation (for 
-· :1. ::::: ·-·· 
details, see Apartheid and the US South e ast, Ch. 4): 
a. Refuses to e ff ectively implement even the 1986 
Congressional compromise sanctions against South Africa 
,'~: :~\ :~~:. ~" ~~~ ~ r· ~~ ~~~ ~~ :: 1 ;~ :;::l :; d F' :.~:· ~~: ~ ~ ;~· ;:; ~~ i~ s; ( ;:~ ~'' ~~ ;~l e ;~· ..... b .~: , .. t ~;' ;~ E~ ~~ f3 ·~: 1;:1·~: t ~~ ;~ ·::. E~ :.~ ~~; <':l.I~;· :;J ,~:) ~s~ n 
may, under the flimsiest pretexti, assist South Africa to 
evade those national and international laws; 
b. Thwarts negotiations for Namibian independence by 
insisting on linking them with the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
+1···om (~nqol a:; 
c. Provides open s upport for the South African supported 
anti-government contra force, UNITA, in Angola, some of it 
through South A+rica in violation o+ the UN embargo; 
d. Built up a military airforce base in Zaire as a second 
channel of aid for UNITA; 
e. Provides mi litary assistance for the Kingdom of Morocco, 
(much of which i t uses in its war against the Saharan Peoples 
Republic), while Morocco provides headquarters for UNITA. 
2. The South African-US supported UNITA focusses on targets tha t 
a1m to disrupt Angola's development and the landlocked 
independent southern African states' efforts to reduce their 
historically-shaped dependence on South Afr ica: 
~. Seeking to del ig itimize and destabilize the Angolan 
government, UNITA attacks peas ant food production and 
development projects, 
b. To thwart the efforts of Angola's SADCC neighbors to use 
them to import and export goods outside of South Africa, 
UNITA destroys Angolan transport networks, especially the 
Benguela Rai lroad, 
I I I . Inc:l'"E·~E:\£", :1. n(~l y 1~1<::\ckE::·c:l !:Jy !...Jb m:i.:!. :i. t:::U""y' i. I"l\/Dl \/ E'f'llt-:'!TL in r·,:·I'' .1. c::<·::\ '! 
the US transnational corporations shift of productive activities 
from the US to that South Africa has direct implications fo r 
development in the US southwest: 
A. The US domestic military !:Juildup, n ecessary to sustain this 
kind of military intervention designed to open up' Africa, has 
direct and hidden costs for Texas: Military spending tends to be 
concentrated among a few firms and in a few areas, thus 
aggravating the lop-sided pattern of state development which 
enriches a few and impoverishes growing numbers citizens: 
1. Texas has 46 military bases: 
.... l ·<l ..... 
a. These cover some 589,220 acres of land (on which they 
pay l ittle or no taxes to the local governments) i n a few 
areas: 
*Fort Hood, with 208,291 acres tops the list; 
*Fort Bliss, with 67,909 acres, comes second; 
*Other large installations include Camp Bullis (27,880 
acres), Red River Army Depot (19,081 acres), Lone Star 
Army Ammo Plant (15,546 acres) and at least a dozen air 
force bases. 
b. Aside from the military personnel living there, who 
come from all over the nation, the bases primarily provide 
relatively low paid service jobs for Texas citizens living 
in the immediate neighborhood. 
c. Hi dden costs include the loss of tax dollars, since the 
land is usually exempt from most or all tax ~ayments; 
environmental degradation, as weapons use and production 
often impact negatively on the surrounding neighborhood; 
and tax expenditures for schools, roads, additional health 
facilities and police protection for military personnel. 
(For illustrations of these costs from the US southeast , see 
Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 10) 
2. Texas military contractors: 
a. In 1984, Texas received $8.75 billion in military 
contracts, placing it third in the nation behind California 
and New York. In 1986, firms operating in Texas received 
$10.1 billion worth of military contracts . The biggest 
military contractors included, as might be expected, 
national high tech firms and several oil majors: 
*The biggest contractor was General Dynamics Corp with a 
third of the total. 
*Bell Boeing and Bell Helicopter Textron, together, held 
ten percent . 
*LTV Aerospace and Development Co, Texas Instruments 
Inc., Electrospace Systems~ and Northern Telecom Inc. 
between them, held roughly ten percent more. 
*Oil companies with 
each included Shell 
and Navaho Refining 
Shell and Mobil play 
refining business. 
contracts exceeding $100 million 
Oil ($330m>; Mobil Oil ($226m>; 
($161 m>; Amoco Corp ($112m). Both 
a major role in South African oil 
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contracts in contributing to increased capital intensive · 
production, reducing employment, adding toxic wastes that 
pollute the environment, and aggravating anti-union 
pol i c::i. (7.'?S .. 
v ')i\1 ..... ,-2. 
_}3.. :i1Ft c: on t ,, .. i hut(:;~!::; t D u.n ci E"l'" m :i. n i n c.:J U~3 v..;aq E~!:; and ~'Jol~ k i n g 
conditions, contributing to ris ing unemployment in the higher 
paid productive sectors, pushing workers into lower paid services 
and trade sectors, causing declining real incomes for the lower 
income sectors of the population; this trend will become more 
evident as devaluation of the US currency reduces the global 
purchasing power of the wages US workers earn. eq, Texas: 
1 
.!. ~ Hiqh rates of unemployment: 
a. Military production, which is 
intensive (ie spends more dollars 
nDt provide as much employment as 
In 1981-1985, Texas ranked first 
hiqhl''j' C<£:tp:i. t.E:tl 
per job created> does 
civilian production. 
in the nation in net 
jobs lost as a result of military prod uction: - 288,040 .. 
Of these, women lDst -59,800, and blacks lost -19,000 
(excludinq military personnel for blacks, as one 
South Carolina black ex-officer told the Peace Tour, the 
c: h o :i. Cie :i. !3 Clf tl,~n t. h ~~ D. I'" my Dl'- .:.i C:\ i. 1 > ( E~1np 1 nyrnen t. F(ec":-~::c::tr- c h 
Associates,474 Hollister Bldg, Lansing, Ml 48933.). 
b. In late 1987, unemployment 1n Texas exceeded the 
national average (7.9% cDmpared to 5.6%), and in several 
Texas counties was roughly double the national rat e: 
*Beaumont-Port Arthur (11.1%>; 
*Brownsville-Harlingen(l4.5%); 
*Corpus-Christie (10.4%); 
*El Paso <10.6%l; 
*Galvaston-Texas City (10%); 
-J<:-1.. .. i:':\ I~ 0'' ci D ( 1 .1:j. • .ij. \ ) !: 
*McAllenburg-Edinburg-Mission (18.3%) 
Business Research, Texas Business Reveiw (Aust i n: 
University of Texas) Feb. 1988. 
L. With the shifting structure of Texas ecDnomy, 
unionization has steadily declined as a percentage of the 
labor force from 16% in 1975 tD 12.5% in 1982. [L. Troy 
and N .. Sheflin, Union Source Book <West Orange, NJ: 
Industrial Relations Data Information Services, 1985.)] 
3. Althouqh in 1984, Texans' statewide per capita income 
($12,572) averaged only slightly below the national average 
($12,789), the poverty pDpulation was growinq: 
..... :1.6 ..... 
1. Wh i le Sherman County is among the nation's 25 most 
prosperous counties, a Harvard University study of Hunger 
showed 29 Texas counties as among the nation's most 
d E::Sf.J rN i:'E1 ~;sed ~ 
:i. :i . .. In 1979, 14 .. 7;~ o+ <:":\11 ·rt:::·>~E:l. n<:; l:i.vF:"!!c:l b''"lc::<t··J t:h<:'~ 
poverty-level, compared to a national average of 12.4% .. 
Even then, the total number of impoverished Texans, 
2,047,000 people, exceeded the total number of 
impoverished citizens living in North and South Carolina 
and Louis i ana , combined .. 
iii. From 1980 to 1986, the numbers of Texans living 
in poverty rose by almost 50%, one in five of the entire 
population . Four million Texans need emergency food; 
800,000 Texans go hungry at some point each month . 
:i . .... / u .... ')··:~· "I ,::.. · ... '.!•• 
below the poverty 
households were at or 
incomes only slightly 
above poverty level .. I ronically, their incomes were too 
low to buy gas to travel to jobs in urban areas, even to 
travel to locations with social services (42 of the 
nation ' s 90 counties without WIC programs--
+ oCJci ./nut1·- :Lt. :i. on pl"·o<JI'""<::tms ······- '-''JE?I~F: in TE">: <'~s;) ( !<<:<.tE· F·~::~J···qu ·:o;on, 
CJp u C: i t. ) u Rio Grande Valley poverty rates average about 
30% but reach 50% in some areas.. A fovrth of the poor 
rural families are headed by women. Only 9% receive 
public assistance. 
v. In urban areas, high rates of poverty especially 
characterized places with high percentaqes of blacks or 
i···i i ;:;;p E:\!""l i C S 'I €0\J ~ 
*Hays in the Austin area (30% Hispanic, 2.7% black>; 
*Brownsville-Harlingen (77% Hispanic) 
*Kaufman in the Dallas area (18% black, 4 .2% Hispanic) 
*Harrison in the Longview-Marshall area(31% black, 1 .. 3% 
i-··1 i :::;p <::\n i c:: ) 
*El Paso (62% Hispan i c, 3.7% black) 
*Bexar in the San Antonio area (46% Hispanic, 7% 
b 1 ac: k) .. 
vi .. With low per capita incomes, the more impoverished 
counties could not finance as adequate schools as the more 
well-to-do counties, espite state subsidies from oil 
revenues, contributing to low educational achievement and 
a relatively high school drop out rate .. 
C.. To cut taxes and pay for the growing military budget (which 
despite Reagan's promises have created a federal deficit equal to 
the entire growth in the nation's national product since 1980), 
the federal government has reduced domestic spending for basic 
..... :l"?' 
·.t.-.~.-l~,~: .•. ~,~ .. ~,:.: ... ,'J~.I~li',• . :..-.·J'e~.:,J,:.;.t!.:. l'.'·'· '~'~~\l,:_:\·;,l_~.· il:.~,~-E-~.·I,:,· ~~,::.t g ~d]~.·l:~.=.::.·,::.'.t.~.·.:,~_;',=,'g the negat i ve effects of the 
- , • - · _ ~ of labor i mplemented by US 
transnational corporations: 
1. Texas never pursued the federal social program do ll ar with 
the same vigor with which it chased after the military buck. 
In 1980, it ranked last among 5 0 states i n fed eral ai~ per 
person ($279 compared to $396 nation-wide) in part because of 
the constitutional ceiling on state welfare spending which 
limits the amount of required matching funds it can put up. 
Hence cuts in federal spendin g did not ap pear as great in 
Texas as elsewhere because it started at a lower base. For 
E·: ~< E:l. n·! p J (-:~: :: 
a. 1980 public welfare alotments averaged $105 per familv. 
about half the national average and fifth from the lowesl' 
:i. n t.hf.:·' n,::l.t ion. 
b. Aid to Dependent Children (AFDC> in Texas 1s restricted 
to single parent families, while other states offer aid to 
two parent families where the wage earner is unemployed. 
i . In 1980, at $109 per family, Texas AFDC payments 
third the national aver age , and third f r om the 
1 u ~ .. , f::! s; t. 
Fe,::tC:i!::·! 
in t h (·:·:· n ,::\ t i on . [ h'. Cr- cJ;< cia 1 f?!.• •1 ·r e;-: E1 ~:; ... :i. n hl-::;.q i r-, ~J 
(Southern Exposure)]. 
i i. In 1986, Texas ranked 47th in terms of AFDC benefits; 
Texas families receiving both AFDC and Food S t amp aid 
I'"E·2·,c:hr:?d Cinly :'S2.6/.. of povt::r-ty lE·~\,.el (F'hys;ic:i.;::~n~::.; 
Task l Force, 1987>; only 61.3% of those eligible 
received AFDC benefits (Texas Department of Human Serv i ces>. 
IV. A peaceful alternative to the present policy of milita~ization 
and inte~vention in support of the status quo to further ''open 
f.::1f 1' .. :i. c ;:~ up'' to U~3 t , ... ,;,;_n ~:;;n <::\ t :i. or .. , E:l. l c: or- p CJI' .. E:\ t. r:2 i n vo 1. VE:>mEn "t. c: ou:!. c:! 
p~ovide far greater benefits to both the peoples o~ Africa and 
the United States: 
A. The b i llions spent in building up US military capacity to 
police the world could be re-directed to providinq p~oductive 
employment opportuniti es, job training, bette~ incomes, and an 
improved social security safety net for US citizens, including 
those living in the Southwest. 
1. Texas fam ilies , overall, lost an estimated $720/family in 
1983 in terms of taxes for themilitary compared to military 
dollars spent in Texas ; this impact affected differ ent 
counties diff e rently (measured in net loss or qain per family): 
ConcJrE: ~:ss:i. on .~'l.1 
Di stl""i ct. 
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Source: Dr. James R. Anderson, Bankrupting America - The Tax 
burden and Expenditures of the Pentagon by Congressional 
District, <Lansing, MI: Employment Research Associates, 1984> 
2 . Between 1981 and 1985, Texans lost 288,040 jobs because 
military expenditures produce, on average, far less jobs than 
dollars spent for peaceful pursuits. 
3. Other trade offs: what Texas gives up for military 
spending: 
*1 A-6# Intruder Aircraft, costing $9 million, could 
provide jobs for 100,000 youths. 
*1 F-14 Jet Fighter, costing $15,6 million, could build 
500 lowcost 2 bedroom homes. 
*1 C-5A Cargo plane, costing $60 million, could feed 
12,000 families of 4 for a year. 
*The Cruise Missile Program, costing $11 billion, could 
finance restoration of the national annual rate of 
investment in public works up to the 1965 level. 
Source: Gilda Haas, Plant Closures - Myths, Realities 
and Responses <Boston: South End Press, 1985> 
*One B-1 bomber could feed 452,000 pre-schoolers for a 
school year. 
*The cost of one Tomahawk cru1se miss ile system could 
provide a one year remedial reading program for 1,317,500 
school age children. 
*Three MX missiles cost enough to provide total adequate 
nutrition to every poor pregnant wo men i n America f or a 
year. 
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Source~ Physicians for Social Responsibili ty, Taurant 
County, Newsletter. 
8. An end to support for repressive governments like those 
in South Africa, Zaire and Morocco, coupled with support for the 
full liberation and development of Southern Africa (and, for that 
matter, Africa ) could open new opportunities for beneficial trade 
based on expanded purchases of US machinery and equipment to meet 
African development needs in the context of mutually beneficial 
trade. 
1. The liberation of South Africa would accelerate 
deve lop ment in South Africa by: 
a. Releasing resources now spent on military (about $8 
billion in SA, 25-50% of budgets of neighbors) for 
development projects; 
b. Establishment of a m1n1mum waqe floor for southern 
Africans would augment the regional market for expanded 
output, stimulating increased investments and output. 
c. SADCC nations, together with a liberated South 
Africa, could plan balanced agricultural and industrial 
growth, reaching levels of development comparable to more 
industrialized nations in a half century. 
~- Development of southern Af r ica along these lines wou ld 
open up possibilities of mutually beneficial trade that 
stimulate creation of jobs and rising incomes on both sides 
of the Atlantic: 
a. The US currently sells 8-10 times as many goods to 
the developed nations of the world as it does to southern 
Africa; 
b. A developing southern Africa - - a land area the s i ze 
of continental US with about 100 million inhabitants --
would provide a rapidly growing market for the 
machinery and equipment which US workers manufacture. 
for every sector, 
C. In this election year , given its strong peace movement 
(see Dallas for Dallas Peace Center, below), committed 
anti-apartheid activists (see Houston) and supporters for 
peace and democracy in Central America, Texas might provide 
the venue for a southwest movemen t for peace and development, 
here and in third world regions like Africa, bringing together 
these kinds of groups from around the region . 
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V. Some facts relat i ng to major Texas towns through which Peace 
tour will pass: (Note: Wh e n you arrive in the t own~ however, ask the 
local organizers to fill you in; hopefully they have begun to 
gather more information along t hese lines) 
A. AUSTIN: 
1. 1984 population=645 ~ 442~ 10% Black~ 18% Hispanic; 30% 
born out of state, but onl y 4.2% foreign born; in 1979, 14% 
received below- poverty level incomes (much higher percent, 
22%, in Hays~ 3 0 % Hispanic). 
2 . A Black community 
has its own apartheid 
Americans living in a 
leader, Ms. Dorothy Tucker, says Austin 
system, with Black s and Mexican 
residentially separated community. 
Has attracted high tech industries and research contracts: 
a. Home of Unive rsity of Texas whose chancellor, Hans 
Mark, was formerly Secretary of Air Force and held 
Reagan - appointment as deputy director of NASA. 
b. Presence of University allegedly helped to attract 
Sematech in a nation-wide competition~ expected to provide 
800 new jobs; Austin spent millions of dollars to attract 
high tech industries . 
~. Earlier, Austin attracted Microelectronics and 
Computer Technology Corporation CMCC), a consortium 
including Control Data, Honeywell*, Lockheed, Martin 
Marietta*, United Technologies*, Motorola*, National 
Semiconductor, RCA, Rockwell and Sperry* Univac (*=known 
to have assets in South Africa in 1984 ) 
d, IBM operates in Austin . 
B. DALLAS-FORT WORTH: 
1 . 1984 Population , 3,348,030, 14.3% Black, 8.5% 
Hispanic; 35% bor n out s ide of state (only 4 . 2% 
foreign-born>; 9.9% below poverty-level in 1979, but 
poverty level is much higher, 14.6%, in Kaufman, (18.9% 
Black) and 12 . 6% in Ellis (12% Black , 10% Hispanic --
although 44% of workers are in manufacturing, more than 
two times the state average>; most Blacks live on on the 
flood plains, sou th of the Tr i nity River, and a higher 
proportion of municipal landfills (including toxi c 
substances) are located in their neighborhood. 
2. Dallas-Fort Worth area receives about 40% of the 
military contracts in Texas; about 10% of population works 
in military-related industries (excluding airforce base 
personnel and military researchers); 
a. 1984: Largest military contractors included: 
*General Dynamics, 34e largest in nation, 1st 1n 
Dallas-Fort Worth - employs 18,000; 
*Texas Instruments - employs 7,800; 
*Bell Helicopter, subsidiary of Textron; 
*Collins Defense Communications, division of 
Rockwell International, nation's 2nd largest 
c:: C:; r··f t:. 1r· E'. c:: t:. CJ r- ;: 
b. Local economist, Lloyd Dumas, in book, The 
Overburdened Economy, points out Dallas could do 
b 1'3;~ t:. t E·~ r-· :: 
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tremendous talent here. With this talent we could make 
a majCJr contribution towards making the American 
economy work again. We just need the political will to 
divert scientisits and engineers awy from the military 
to the creation of better civilian commercial goods and 
'' h\i E·' c:: .:,, r·1 j···~ ,::-\ \/ E· Et !:''· t: 1··· on ~J m i 1 :i. t: a.1 ... y V·J :i. t. h m u c:: h 1 c• i .. ·J c-::· r·· 1 r::::· v f"'' 1 s. n + 
spending -- without bankrupting our ec::CJnnmy. With such 
a change in direction, we face a bright future; without 
it, the future holds an accelerating decline in our 
persona:!. standard of living, the deterioration of our 
national economy and still further reductions in our 
natiCJnal security. 
Article in Dallas Peace Times, Vol. 1, No. 7 
3. Dallas has a Peace Center (3100 Martin Luther King Blvd, 
Dallas, TX 75215; 214-421-4082), with a part-time director, 
which publishes Peace Times which brings facts about 
peaceful alte~natives to Dallas-Fort Worth citizens. 
1. 1984 population=526,425 (62% Mexican American, 4% 
B1<:3.c:k). 
2. A majCJr gateway to Mexico's 
(see above)~ El Paso serves as 
channel for their output. 
maqu1ladora industries 
transport and financial 
3. In 1979, befo~e t he oil bubble bu~st~ howeve~, 21% <mo~e 
than one out of five pe~sons) of El Paso's inhabitants 
received less than pove~ty level inc omes -- evidence that 
' maqu ilado~anization' -- whethe~ across the border or across 
the ocean -- denies p~ospe~ity fo~ a la~ge portion of the 
population. 
D. HOUSTON-GALVESTON-BRAZORIA 
1. The largest city in Texas, the fou~th la~gest in the 
nation, Houston's 1984 population=3,164,177. About a 28% a~e 
Black, giving it the largest black pop ulation in any s outhern 
US city. 15% of the popu l ation is Mexican American . (38% of 
t he population is f~om out of state, 7 % is foreig n bo~n.) 
2. Growing pove~ty: The oil industry collapse hit Houston 
ha~d. At the same time, its citizens ex pe~ience a majo~ net 
loss per family in military spending. In 1979 , 10% of 
Houstonians received below-poverty-line Incomes, but this 
percentage has risen since then. 
~. Racism: Houston does not have zoning, but unofficiall y, 
until 1980, the city seemed to have zoned the black 
neighborh oods for waste disposal. Six of the city's e i ght 
ga~bage incinerators and 80% the city-owned landfills -- used 
for disposal of solid waste, including toxic substances --
were located in black neighbo~hoods. Black residents b~ought 
s uit and finally successfu l ly pressured the city to end this 
practice, part of a growing black support of envi~onmental 
p~ese~vation. 
4. Neve~theless , the Houston anti-apartheid movement has 
succeeded in getting the Houston city council to pass a 
st~ong anti-apa~theid ~esolution (Might it also o f fi ci a lly 
welcome the Af~ica Peace Tou~?) 
F. SAN ANTONIO: 1984 population=l,l88,544 <44 % Mexican 
American, 7% Blackl; 30% born out of state, 7% foreign bo~n; 1n 
1979 (even before the oil boom collapsed), 18% (a lmost one out of 
five inhabitants) received below-poverty-line inc omes. 
G. WACO: 1984 Population=l82,115 (15% Black, 9% Hispanic); 20% 
from out of state, but only 2% fo~eign born; 17.2% below pove~ty 
l e vel, though 24% of labor fo~ce is in manufactu~ ing , compared to 
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